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ILLEGITIMATES AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
LALLI v LALLI-A RETREAT FROM
TRIMBLE V GORDON

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade the United States Supreme Court has reviewed state
statutues which allegedly discriminated against illegitimate children in the
3
2
fields of wrongful death,' workmen's compensation, welfare and support,
4
5
social security, and intestate succession. In dealing with the equal protection problems 6 raised in those cases, the Court used an ad hoc approach
rather than articulating a clear standard of review. Thus, except for the
specific holdings of the decided cases, the law on the subject of equal protec7
tion for illegitimate children is still unsettled.
Lal/i v. Lalh,8 the Court's most recent decision on the rights of illegitimates, upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring an order
of filiation to establish paternity during the putative father's lifetime before
a child born out of wedlock could inherit intestate from the father. 9 To
evaluate the emerging standard of equal protection review for illegitimates,
the significance of Lalh lies in its rationale rather than its narrow holding.
The purpose of this comment is to ascertain the judicial standard of
review currently applicable to equal protection issues concerning the rights
of illegitimate children. To do so, the paper presents an analysis of the
Supreme Court's prior decisions involving discrimination against illegitimates, examines the Court's analytical approaches to the equal protection
issues raised in those cases, and discusses the rationale of Lalh', which signals
a retreat from the equal protection standard articulated in Trmb/le v.
Gordon 10 less than one year earlier.
1. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968).
2. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
3. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411
U.S. 619 (1973).
4. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aJ'd,418 U.S. 901 (1974); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aJ'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
5. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
6. The equal protection guarantee is found in the fourteenth amendment: "No state shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
7. For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions on illegitimacy, see generally
Note, lllegitmnacy and Equal Protecton." Two Tiers or An Analytical Crab-Bag?, 7 Loy. CHi. L.J. 754
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Two Trs]; Note, Illegtnimacy And Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.

479 (1974); Note, Const. Law.- Equal Protectionfor lllegitimates, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 392 (1978).
8. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
9. Id. at 261-62, 275-76. For the text of the New York statute, see note 68 infa.

10. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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ILLEGITIMACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

During the sixties the Supreme Court developed a "two-tier" approach
to equal protection. The first tier approach, the rational basis test, is used in
determining the validity of state statutes which deal with economic and social welfare legislation.'' The Court generally holds such statutes valid on
the theory that they do not violate federal constitutional guarantees so long
as they bear any reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative purpose.' 2 Chief Justice Warren best articulated this approach in McGowan v.
Maland13 when he said: "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective . . . .A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'1 4 On the other
hand, where a fundamental right' 5 is threatened or a suspect classification
such as race, 16 alienage,17 or ancestry' 8 is involved, the second tier test of
strict scrutiny is applied. Under that test, the government is required affirmatively to show that it is pursuing a "compelling" or "overriding" goal.
Under such circumstances the classification will not be sustained unless it is
apparent that it is necessary to promote that compelling end, interest, or
purpose.
Certain areas of discrimination including classifications based on illegitimacy defy such neatly packaged categorizations.' 9 Thus, the strict scrutiny
test has not generally been applied to cases involving illegitimates because
that test is reserved for suspect classifications. The first tier approach or rational basis test is also inappropriate because illegitimacy involves personal
rights which deserve greater consideration than those involved with mere
commercial factors. For these troublesome classifications, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court move to a middle-level scrutiny, such as Marshall's balancing approach 20 or Gunther's "means-focused" scrutiny. 2 '
11. This test was set forth in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79
(1911).
12. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
13. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
14. Id at 425-26.
15. Fundamental rights include the right to vote (Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966)); the right to procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); criminal procedural
rights (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969)). Seegenerally Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1127-31 (1969).

16. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
17. Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633 (1948).
18.
19.
shall, J.,
can deal

Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Mardissenting). The difficulty with the two-tiered approach to equal protection is that it
adequately with the extremes which are clearly socio-economic or clearly fundamental

but fails to work effectively in those cases that fall in between.
20. Justice Marshall discusses his balancing approach in his dissents to San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,
90 (1971); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). See generally Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L.
REV. 945 (1975); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1974); Note, The
Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication. An Analysis, A Justiftcaton and Some Criteria,
27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Less Restrictive Alternative].
21. Gunther, The Supreme Court /97/ Teirm-Forward In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
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Gunther's relatively narrow ground of decision requires the showing of
a substantial relationship between an asserted state interest and the means
used to achieve it in order to sustain a statute's constitutionality. The test is
more demanding than the traditional rational basis test because the Court
assesses the means in terms of a stated legislative objective rather than mere
conjecture. 2 2 This strengthened rational basis test has the Court doing more
to assure rationality of means without unduly infringing upon legislative
23
prerogatives regarding ends.
In contrast, Justice Marshall has urged the adoption of his sliding scale
model, under which the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications "depends upon the Constitutional significance of
the interest affected and the invidiousness of the particular class."' 24 Once
the appropriate level of review is determined, it is applied to the examination of three factors: the legitimacy of the state interest, the reasonableness
of the means used, and the availability of alternatives. 25 Until the Lal decision, the trend in illegitimacy equal protection cases seemed to favor adoption of Marshall's balancing approach.
Prior to 1968 the Supreme Court did not apply the equal protection
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to statutory classifications based on
illegitimacy.2 6 In 1968, however, in Levy v. Louisiana27 and its companion
case Glona v. American Guarantee &Surety Co. ,28 the Court held it to be a violation of the equal protection clause to deny illegitimate children the right to
maintain an action for their mother's wrongful death or to deny a mother
the right to recover for the wrongful death of her children born out of wedlock. Unfortunately, the theoretical basis for those two decisions was not
made entirely clear by the Court. Certain language came close to characterizing illegitimacy as a suspect classification; nevertheless, other language apparently utilized the rational basis standard. In Lev,, Justice Douglas
described discrimination against illegitimates as "invidious. . . when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was
done the mother."' 29 However, in Glona, the Court held that the state had no
rationalbasis to believe that denying recovery to the mother of illegitimates
would tend to reduce illegitimate births. 30 The contrasting language used in
Levy and Glona illustrates the difficulty the Court had in applying the tradiCourt. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther).
22. See id at 20.
23. Note, Illegiimacy andEqualProtecton, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 479, 490 (1974); See Two Trs,
supra note 7, at 758.
24. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
25. 7he Less Restnctive Alternatlwe, supra note 20, at 1008.
26. See Krause, Equal Protectionfor the lllegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REx'. 477, 478-82 (1967).
Professor Krause reported no cases in which the issue of discrimination against illegitimates had
been discussed in equal protection terms. However, he found one case in which the equal protection challenge had been made and dismissed, Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E.2d 79, 81
(1944).
27. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
28. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. at 72.
30. 391 U.S. at 75.

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 57:3

tional "two-tiered" analysis to statutes which discriminated against illegitimates. It is not unnatural, therefore, that other courts, in subsequently
31
applying those decisions, interpreted them in different ways.
Despite the seemingly progressive views enunciated in Levy and Glona,
three years thereafter the Court refused to adopt a similar rationale in Labhe
v. Vincent. 32 That case involved a Louisiana statute which entitled an acknowledged illegitimate child to inherit from his father, but only to the exclusion of the state. The Labihe Court applied a policy of total deference to
the state legislation, emphasizing that the choice reflected by the intestate
succession statutes was within the power of the state to make. The Court
only alluded to a standard of review in a brief footnote, stating "even if we
were to apply the 'rational basis' test . . . that statute clearly has a rational
basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family life and directing
disposition of property left within the State."' 33 Thus the Court seemed to
suggest that it would accord total deference to state legislation in areas of
probate administration on the theory that such matters are traditionally
within the regulatory power of the individual states.
Justice Brennan's dissent clearly showed the fallacy in the reasoning of
the majority. He pointed out that although no one disputed Louisiana's
right to pass laws dealing with inheritance, that fact did not make the equal
protection clause of the constitution inapplicable. 34 In testing the validity of
such laws he said: "It is precisely state action which is subjected by the Four'35
teenth Amendment to its restraints."
One year later, in Weberv. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co. ,36 the Court invalidated a Louisiana workmen's compensation law that granted full recovery to
parents of legitimate and acknowledged children but limited the scope of
such benefits in the case of unacknowledged illegitimates. In doing so the
Court enunciated a standard of review for equal protection analysis of illegitimacy cases for the first time. Justice Powell, advocating Marshall's balancing approach in this area of discrimination, stated: "[W]hen state
statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights,
this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . .The essential inquiry [is], however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" 37 However, Powell's decision was not predicated on any such
31. For a discussion of various state court interpretations of Levy and Glona, see Krause,
Legtnnate and Illegitimate Ofpring of Levy v.Louisiana-FirstDecisions on Equal Protectionand Patern'ty,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 (1969).
32. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
33. Id at 536 n.6. In justice Brennan's dissent, he applied his own fourteenth amendment
analysis to the subject and concluded that even under the rational basis test the statute was not
constitutional because unmarried parents would not conform to societal ways just to avoid possible discriminatory treatment their future offspring might receive. Id at 548 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id at 549. See Petrillo, Labtne v. Vincent: I/legitimates, Inheritance,and the FourteenthAmendment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377 (1971).
35. 401 U.S. at 549.
36. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
37. Id at 172-73. Justice Powell apparently accomplished Marshall's balancing test in one
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balancing test.38 Instead, he apparently relied upon a lower level scrutiny,
similar to Gunther's "means-focused" test.3 9 He stated that it "cannot be
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because their offspring
may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation. 4 0 Thus the
statute was invalidated because inferior classification of dependent, unacknowledged illegitimates bears no significant relation to the legitimate state
purpose of promoting family relations. In accordance with Gunther's
"means-focused" approach, the Court required rationality in fact-the legislative means must substantially further the articulated legislative ends. 4 '
Nevertheless, by stating one standard and applying another, the Court in
Weber left unanswered the question of exactly where between the rational
basis and strict scrutiny tests the correct analysis lies.
In subsequent cases, there was no clarification as to the proper standard
42
of judicial scrutiny in cases involving discrimination against illegitimates.
In one such case, Gomez v. Per'z,4 3 the issue was whether a Texas statute
could constitutionally grant legitimate children a judicially enforceable right
to support from their natural father and at the same time deny that right to
illegitimate children. Relying on Levy and Weber, the Court made the following broad statement: "[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against
illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children
generally."' 44 Although the Court recognized that a legitimate state purpose
existed in preventing fraudulent paternity suits and that such problems
could not lightly be brushed aside, it nevertheless concluded that "neither
can they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." ' 45 This was the first time in considering such
46
cases that the Court appeared to be utilizing the balancing approach.
Under either the traditional rational basis test or Gunther's "means-focused"
approach, the Texas statute could have been upheld since the denial of support to illegitimate children could, in fact, further the state's objective to
prevent the assertion of fraudulent claims. Instead of using either of these
standards, the Court balanced the importance of the interest threatened
(support to illegitimates) against the importance of the state goal sought to
step, wherein he balanced all the relevant factors. The Less Restrc/we Alernatlze, supra note 20, at
1009.
38. See 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 411 (1978).
39. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40. 406 U.S. at 173.
41. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
42. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). In this case the Court invalidated a social security provision which barred recovery by illegitimate children born after the
onset of the worker's disability. Without articulating a standard of review, the Court found no
reasonable relationship between the classification and the governmental purpose of discouraging spurious claims. In New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), the
Court struck down a New Jersey program which provided welfare only to low income family
units consisting of married couples with either natural or adopted children. The Court seemed
to employ a rational basis test to determine whether the program was a means for achieving the
stated objective.

43. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
44. Id at 538.
45. Id
46. Two Ters, supra note 7, at 762.
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be achieved (preventing fraudulent paternity claims) and came to a decision
'4 7
that was "logical" and "just."
Levy's early intimation that illegitimacy might be a suspect class was
finally firmly rejected by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Lucas.48 The
challenged statute, which dealt with eligibility requirements for receiving
social security benefits, granted a presumption of dependency to legitimate
children and illegitimates who were entitled to inherit from the decedent
under state law. Other illegitimates would receive benefits only if they could
establish dependency by providing evidence of cohabitation or support by
the wage earner at the time of death. In Lucas, the illegitimate children
were unable to prove dependency at the time of their father's death because
he died following an extended absence from home. The Court held the statutory classification permissible because the presumptions were reasonably
49
related to the likelihood of dependency at death.
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the
appropriate level of scrutiny was "less than [the] strictest . . . [but] not a
toothless one."' 50 Then, after acknowledging the substantial relationship between a statutory presumption of dependency and administrative convenience, he stated that the validity of such statutes depended upon whether
"the statutory classifications . . . [are] reasonable empirical judgments that
are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child's
dependency at the time of a parent's death." ' 5 ' Following an extended review of the factors involved, he concluded that the statute was valid because
it "does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations." ' 52 Thus, Justice Blackmun utilized Marshall's balancing process 53 by checking the
relationship between statutory objectives and means and by testing whether
the statute was designed to ensure that the factors giving rise to a presumption of dependency substantially related to the likelihood of actual dependency.
Trimble v. Gordon,54 decided less than a year before La/l', provided further clarification of the Court's evolving equal protection framework in dealing with state statutes regarding illegitimates. Deta Mona Trimble, the
illegitimate child of Sherman Gordon, was openly acknowledged and supported by her father in accordance with a paternity order. When Mr.
Gordon died in 1974 without leaving a will, Deta Mona was unable to inherit from him because under Illinois intestacy law an illegitimate child's
parents must intermarry and the child must have been formally acknowledged before she (or he) could inherit.
47. 409 U.S. at 538.
48. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
49. Id at 510-11.
50. Id at 510. The Lucas Court noted that illegitimates do not suffer the political
powerlessness characteristic of classes which traditionally receive strict scrutiny. Id at 506 n. 13
(citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).

51. 427 U.S. at 510.
52. Id at 513.
53. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.

54. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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An analysis of Justice Powell's decision holding the Illinois statute unconstitutional makes it evident that the Court was tending to favor an equal
protection approach in the area of discrimination against illegitimates
closely tailored to Marshall's balancing approach.5 5 At the outset of his
opinion Justice Powell in effect rejected the reasoning in Labize. He stated
that while judicial deference is appropriate when the challenged statute involves a "substantial state interest" in providing for the prompt determination of those entitled to a distribution of a decedent's property, "there is a
point beyond which . . .deference cannot justify discrimination. ' 56 In discussing the Labihe case he said: "lit is difficult to place [that case] in the
pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions and subsequent cases have
limited its force as a precedent." 5 7 Instead, he cited Weber and Lucas as appropriate precedents, stating: "The Court demands more than rational basis, but less than compelling state interest when classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights .... "58
Justice Powell's treatment of the state's main argument in defense of the
statute exemplifies the Court's shift from its previous ad hoc approach to a
balancing approach. The state argued that its interest was to establish a
method of property distribution unencumbered by difficulties in proof of
paternity and dangers of fraudulent claims. 5 9 Answering that contention,
Justice Powell explained that serious problems of proof of paternity might
justify a more demanding standard for illegitimates claiming under their father's estate than that required for illegitimates claiming under their
mother's estate, but that difficulty did not justify total statutory disinheritance for illegitimates whose fathers die intestate. 60 He held that the constitutional flaw in the Illinois statute was that it did not fit its intended purpose
closely enough: "The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle
ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity. For at least some significant categories of illegitimate
children . . . [whose paternity could clearly be established] inheritance
rights can be recognized without jeopardizing . . . [estate] settlement[s] .... -61
In holding the Illinois statute invalid, Justice Powell reaffirmed the view
expressed by the Court in Lucas that the statute must be "carefully tuned to
55. See note 20 supra. But see43 Mo. L. REV. 116, 119 (1978); 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 411
(1978); 17 WASHBURN L.J. 392, 397 (1978).
56. 430 U.S. at 767 n.12.

57. Id.
58. Id at 766-67.
59. The other state interests sought to be achieved were encouraging family relationships
and discouraging casual liasons. The Court could not find a rational relationship between denying illegitimate children the right to inherit from their fathers and discouraging casual liasons
or promoting family relations. 430 U.S. at 768-70. As the Court had previously declared in
Weber, "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 406 U.S. at 175. See generally 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 609 (1977); 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 822 (1978).
60. 430 U.S. at 774.
61. Id at 770.
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alternative considerations." ' 62 He held that the Illinois statute did not meet
63
this standard because it "extend[ed] well beyond its asserted purposes."
Accurate and efficient disposition of the father's property would not have
been compromised by allowing his illegitimate child's claim under the circumstances.
In a footnote, Justice Powell explained that states were free to prescribe
different forms of proof of paternity; they need not accept inaccurate and
inefficient methods. By way of illustration, he indicated that prior adjudication or formal acknowledgement of paternity were forms of proof that would
not be constitutionally invalid. 64 Justice Powell was, however, careful to
point out that a statute which promotes a legitimate state interest can exclude illegitimate children only when it is "carefully tailored to eliminate
65
imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity."
The Trbmble court thus examined the substantiality of the state interest,
the reasonableness of the means adopted, and the availability of alternatives,
since a final determination of the statute's constitutionality depended upon a
balancing of the importance of the interest threatened against the importance of the goals sought to be achieved and the efeclieness of the statute in
66
achieving them.
The decisions from Levy to Trmble exemplify the diverse approaches the
Supreme Court has taken in applying the equal protection clause in the case
of illegitimates. If one could prognosticate after an analysis of the Court's
meandering approach, it would seem that Marshall's balancing approach
would be the preferred analysis in future cases. In Trimble, Justice Powell
went a step further and not only required that the statute be designed to
achieve its stated purposes, but also investigated the means imposed by the
statutory scheme to accomplish its valid state objective.
II.

LALLIv. LALLI

Only eight months after the Supreme Court in Trbmble declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional, the Court in Lal/hv. La//i 6 7 upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute which required that an order of filiation be
obtained during the lifetime of the putative father as a condition precedent
for an illegitimate child to inherit intestate. How does the decision in Lal/i
fit into the Supreme Court's evolving equal protection framework? Is La/l a
logical extension of the holdings in Trimble or a retreat from the views expressed therein? A comparison of the Court's analysis of the two statutes
involved shows some logic in the seemingly inconsistent results.
Both cases dealt with illegitimates claiming the right to inherit intestate
from their respective fathers. Robert Lalli, like Deta Trimble, had been
publicly acknowledged and supported by his putative father; but Lalli, un62. Id at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
63. 430 U.S. at 772.
64. Id at 772 n.14.

65. Id
66. See Note, I/egizhmagy and Equal Arotectan, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479 (1974).
67. 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (5-4 decision).
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like Deta Trimble, received that support without any judicial support order.
When Mario Lalli was murdered in 1974, Robert Lalli petitioned the Surrogates Court for a compulsory accounting, claiming that he was entitled to
inherit from Mario as his son. The petition was opposed on the ground that
even if Robert were in fact Mario's child, he was not a lawful distributee
under the New York statute of intestate succession, which provided that an
illegitimate child could not inherit intestate from his father unless an order
of filiation had been obtained during the putative father's lifetime.68 Robert
Lalli contended that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment. The
evidence established conclusively that Mario Lalli had acknowledged openly
and often that Robert was his son. Despite that uncontroverted fact, the
New York courts upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Robert Lalli
appealed that determination to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court initially remanded the case for further consideration in light of its
decision in Trmble. Upon remand, the New York Court of Appeals once
more upheld the constitutionality of its statute. When the case again
reached the United States Supreme Court, it declared that the New York
statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Powell, writing for the Lalh majority, reaffirmed Trmble as setting the appropriate standard for review. However, a careful scrutiny of the
rationale clearly shows that in reaching his conclusion that the New York
statute was valid, Powell used Gunther's "means-focused" approach rather
than the balancing approach employed in Trzmble. 69 In the first part of the
Lalh" opinion, he stated that there was a substantial relationship between
New York's legitimate state interest in providing "for the just and orderly
disposition of property at death" and its statutory requirement for the obtaining of an order of filiation during the father's lifetime before an illegitimate child could inherit intestate. 7° He found a state interest to be directly
involved because of the clear possibility, among other reasons, that spurious
claims of paternity might be filed. In addition, he pointed out that problems
in the administration of estates, such as cite and service of unknown illegitimate children, would be alleviated. Justice Powell then proceeded to consider whether the means adopted by New York State substantially furthered
its interest. He came to the conclusion that the requirement for a paternity
proceeding during the lifetime of the father was not constitutionally invidi68. Section 4-1.2 of N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW (McKinney 1967) in its entirety
provided:
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(I)
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his
issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime
of the father made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted
during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the
absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
69. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
70. 439 U.S. at 268.
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ous because it would promote accuracy and reliability, and would permit the
alleged father to defend himself and his reputation.
Up to this point in the Lali decision, Justice Powell's reasoning was
consistent with the rationale of Trimble. However, the departure from Trimble becomes apparent when the appellant's contention and Powell's answer
thereto are considered. As a basis for his appeal, Robert Lalli argued that:
[Section] 4-1.2, like the statute at issue in Trimble, exclude[d] "significant categories of illegitimate children" who could be allowed
to inherit "without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of their intestate fathers' estates." He urge[d] that . . . "known" illegitimate
children who, despite the absence of an order of filiation . . .can
present convincing proof of paternity--cannot rationally be denied
inheritance as they pose none of the risks § 4-1.2 was intended to
71
minimize.
In response, Justice Powell stated: "Our inquiry under the Equal Protection
Clause does not focus on the abstract 'fairness' of a statute, but on whether
the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenu'7 2
ous that it lacks the rationahy contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
He then added, "we have no basis to question . . .[the statute's] detail be' 73
yond the evident consistency and substantiality.
Thus the Court failed to employ the analysis utilized in Trimble, for the
"rationality contemplated" in Trmble was a balancing process where the
least restrictive alternative was an important consideration. 74 The balancing standard implicitly must consider the "fairness" of a statute by comparing the state's justification for the statutory scheme with the means employed
to realize it. According to Trimble, if the means are "carefully tailored to
eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity," while still achieving the state objective, the two interests are bal75
anced.
Consistent with Marshall's balancing approach, the Court in Lucas had
upheld a statutory classification because it was "reasonably related to the
likelihood of dependency at death." ' 76 Similarly, the Court in Trimble had
struck down the Illinois statutory classification because it was "overly broad"
and extended "well beyond the asserted purposes."' 77 However, the Court in
Lal refused to extend its analysis that far. Without substantiation for his
conclusion, Justice Powell stated: "This is not a requirement that inevitably
disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of children born out of wed78
lock."
If the Court had inquired into the effectiveness of the means employed
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 272.

Id at 273 (emphasis added).
Id at 274 (quoting from Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515-16 (1976)).
See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
Note, II CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 352, 353 (1977).
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976). See notes 50-53 and accompanying text

supra.

77. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977).
text supra.
78. 439 U.S. at 273.

See notes 54-66 and accompanying
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to determine whether significant categories of illegitimate children could be
allowed to inherit intestate without compromising the state interest, it could
well have found that the number disqualified under the New York condition
precedent was indeed large.7 9 As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent, "it
is difficult to imagine an instance in which an illegitimate child, acknowledged and voluntarily supported by his father, would ever inherit intestate
under the New York scheme."'8 0 Realistically viewed, the failure to obtain
an order of filiation might have been due to the fact that the putative father
was supporting the child and had acknowledged paternity; therefore, obtaining such an order would have served no real purpose. Justice Brennan
pointed out that where children are being supported by the alleged father,
institution of a paternity proceeding is unlikely to occur for two reasons: (1)
most individuals are unaware of the necessity for initiating such a proceeding, and (2) the failure to institute such a judicial proceeding might result
from the fear that the support might be withheld or that the relationship of
the parties might thereby be disrupted. 8 ' In addition, mothers may be unwilling to bring an action against the putative father for fear of public embarrassment. Thus, the practical effect of the New York statutory scheme
was to forfeit an acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate child's future right of inheritance.8 2 If such a forfeiture resulted from a lack of proof,
it would of course be justified; but certainly there are less drastic means of
79. See Note, I I CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 352, 353 (1977), where it states that "fewer than 50
percent of illegitimate children are acknowledged or adjudicated."
80. 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In May of 1979, however, the New York
legislature amended the former statute in an attempt to take into account the "willing" fathers
who voluntarily support their illegitimate children. The statute presently provides that a father
may voluntarily sign an acknowledgment of paternity within ten years after the birth of the
child. The writing must be signed in the presence of a witness and acknowledged by such
witness before a notary public. The new legislation also establishes a central registry in the
Department of Social Services for filing such acknowledgment. The registry will serve to provide notice to personal representatives of the existence of the illegitimate. 1979 N.Y. Laws, ch.
139.
Nine months after the La//" decision, the Surrogate's Court of New York decided Estate of
Herbert Rodriguez, 420 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1979). In that case, the evidence conclusively established that the petitioner, Herbert's mother, and the decedent were the infant's parents. Although the original birth certificate did not list anyone as the father, two years later both
decedent and petitioner executed a form provided by the Bureau of Vital Statistics naming the
decedent as the father. Their signatures on the corrected birth certificate were sworn to before a
commissioner of deeds. Since there was no judicial determination during the decedent's lifetime
as to the child's paternity, however, the court was constrained under the holding of La//i to
conclude that the child was not a distributee under the decedent's estate.
Although the new provision of the New York statute liberalizes the rights of illegitimate
children to inherit from the paternal side of the family, it would not have changed the outcome
of Rodnrguz, because the birth certificate was neither executed with the formalities required by
the amended statute nor filed with the Department of Social Services. The result of La//i is
clear: only by compliance with the explicit terms of a state statute can an illegitimate child
become a distributec of his father's intestate estate even where evidence conclusively establishes
that the decedent was in fact the father of the child.
81. 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. The Court never addressed whether it was constitutional to require an order of filiation
to be commenced within the first two years of the child's birth as stated in § 4-1.2 because the
appellant had never commenced a paternity proceeding at any time. Thus, the Court chose to
limit its ruling to the narrower issue of whether the requirement that a judicial order of filiation
be issued during the lifetime of the father of an illegitimate was constitutional. See 439 U.S. at
267 n.5.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:3

screening fraudulent claims of paternity and assuring accuracy in administering estates than the absolute bar laid down in the New York statute.8 3 As
Justice Brennan pointed out, to serve the state interest New York could have
required elevated standards of proof; e.g., public notice and a short statute of
84
limitations.
CONCLUSION

The Court in Lali failed to recognize or refused to consider the issue of
"alternative considerations" and retreated from the Trmble balancing approach to a lower level scrutiny,85 similar to Gunther's "modest interventionism . . . which permits the state to select any means that substantially
further legislative purposes." 8 6 As the Lalh decision illustrates, there may be
a valid state interest which a classification does in fact substantially further;
but by employing Gunther's "means-focused" test, the Court will allow the
burden imposed by a statutory classification to go beyond the quantum necessary to accomplish the desired goal. 87 Because of this potential overinclusiveness of the "means-focused" approach, many commentators suggest that
Marshall's balancing approach as exemplified in Trimble is the preferred judicial standard in illegitimacy cases. 88 As a test for the constitutionality of
any statute which distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate children,
the balancing approach is stricter than the "means-focused" rationale of
Lal: it would mandate that the means chosen to achieve a state objective
be "carefully attuned to alternative considerations."
From Levy to Lalh, however, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
adopt any consistent mode of analysis in equal protection cases involving the
rights of illegitimate children. In place of any definitive guidelines, the
Court has preferred an ad hoc approach. With the "means-focused" ration83. Eleven states have adopted some version of the Uniform Probate Code provision which
allows an illegitimate child to inherit from his father if his parents subsequently marry each
other, or if paternity is adjudicated before his father's death or established afterward by clear
and convincing proof. The states include Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Del., Fla., Idaho, Ind., Mont.,
N.D., S.D., and Utah. 32 ARK. L. REV. 120, 130 (1978).
A conflict exists in the Colorado statutes between the Colorado Probate Code, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-11-109 (1973) and the Uniform Parentage Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-103, 105
(1973). Under the Colorado Probate Code, for purposes of intestate succession a person born
out of wedlock is the child of the father only if the parents marry before or after the child's birth
or if paternity is established by adjudication before death of the father or after his death by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, the Uniform Parentage Act totally eliminates the
concept of illegitimacy and does not qualify inheritance on subsequent legitimization of the
child.
In five states (Cal., Iowa, Kan., Md., and Vt.) open and notorious recognition of an illegitimate child by the father will establish inheritance rights. 32 ARK. L. REV. 120, 130 (1978).
84. 439 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. The retreat from Trmble may be attributable to differences in the impact of the Illinois
statute, which the Court held unconstitutional in Trimble, and the New York statute upheld in
Lalh. The language of the Illinois statute presented an absolute bar to any action to establish
or acknowledge paternity other than marriage between the mother and father. The New York
statute was not an insurmountable barrier, however, because paternity could at least be established in a judicial proceeding in lieu of marriage. Id. at 266-68.
86. See Gunther, supra note 21, at 21 (emphasis added).
87. Id at 47-48.
88. See note 20 supra.
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ale of Lal/ following the balancing approach of Trnmble by less than a year,
there is no way to prognosticate the analytical approach courts will choose in
reviewing this area of equal protection.

Jane Guern

